This study constructs a new data set on unemployment rates in Latin America and the Caribbean and then explores the determinants of unemployment. We compare different countries, finding that unemployment is influenced by the size of the rural population and that the effects of government regulations are generally weak. We also examine large, persistent increases in unemployment over time, finding that they are caused by contractions in aggregate demand. These demand contractions result from either disinflationary monetary policy or the defense of an exchange-rate peg in the face of capital flight. Our evidence supports hysteresis theories in which short-run changes in unemployment influence the natural rate.
Introduction
What determines the long-run level of unemployment, or natural rate? This paper examines this question for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
We see three related reasons for studying unemployment in Latin America.
First, there is a lot of variation to be explained. For example, a quick glance at data for the 2000s suggests that the natural rate is around 5% in Mexico, 10% in Chile, and 15% in Argentina. In many countries, unemployment has changed greatly over time. In Argentina, unemployment was about 5% in the 1980s.
Second, Latin American unemployment is understudied. Few economists have made systematic efforts to explain the variation that we've noted. Heckman and Pagés (2004) seek to explain unemployment with differences across countries in government regulations, but they are mostly unsuccessful. The scarcity of research on Latin American unemployment contrasts with the huge literatures on unemployment in Europe and the United States.
Third, research on Latin America promises to shed light on unemployment more generally. The U.S. and European data have been mined extensively, and economists still disagree about the determinants of long-run unemployment.
Some argue that labor-market institutions are the key factor (e.g. Nickell, 1997) , some emphasize the interaction of institutions with a variety of macroeconomic shocks, (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) , and some argue that monetary policy influences long-run unemployment through hysteresis mechanisms (e.g. Ball, 2009) . Latin America provides a fresh set of experiences that will help us test these ideas.
A major reason that Latin American unemployment is understudied is lack of data. Unemployment statistics are fragmentary, and there are big differences in how unemployment is measured across countries and over time. Therefore, a major part of our project involves data gathering. We examine two data sets, one constructed by the Interamerican Development Bank and one that we have put together ourselves. The two data sets are complementary: the first is more consistent across countries, while the second provides longer time series within countries. Section 2 of this paper describes these data.
Section 3 uses the IADB data to examine differences in unemployment across countries. Our strongest result is that unemployment depends negatively on the proportion of the population in rural areas. We find mixed evidence on whether payroll taxes affect unemployment, and no effect of legal restrictions on hiring and firing.
Section 4 uses the new data we have constructed to analyze changes in unemployment over time. Our most important results concern large increases in long-run unemployment, which we measure by smoothing annual unemployment with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. We identify six episodes since the 1970s in which a country's long-run unemployment rate rose by more than four percentage points. In every case, the cause was a deep recession produced by a fall in aggregate demand. In some episodes, the underlying shock was a tightening of monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation. In other episodes, capital flight caused a severe recession because a country maintained a rigid exchange-rate peg.
In conventional macroeconomics, demand-driven recessions affect unemployment in the short run but not in the long run. Thus, our interpretation of increases in unemployment is at odds with conventional models. Our evidence supports theories of hysteresis, in which short-run changes in unemployment influence the evolution of the natural rate. Section V concludes the paper, and an Appendix provides details about our data.
Unemployment Data
We will examine two sets of unemployment data, one constructed by the Interamerican Development Bank and one that we have put together ourselves.
The two data sets are complementary: the first is more consistent across countries, while the second provides longer time series within countries. The rest of this section describes these data.
A. The IADB Data
The IADB provides annual unemployment rates for 19 countries. The data start in 1990 but are highly incomplete: for many countries, there are only a few observations. There is no rhyme or reason to which years are available (e.g., for
Ecuador, we have data for 1994, 1995, 1998, 2006, and 2007 ; for Venezuela we have data for 1991 through 2004). For most countries, the data include separate unemployment rates for urban and rural areas as well as nationwide unemployment.
The virtue of this data set is that the IADB has tried to adjust for differences across countries in definitions of unemployment. The data are sufficiently standardized that we can plausibly use them for cross-country comparisons of unemployment rates. In the IADB data, an individual is asked about a "reference week" shortly before the survey and is considered unemployed if he (i) Did not work or have a job during the reference week and (ii) Searched actively during the reference week. Active search involves contact with potential employers, interviewing for jobs, filling out applications or contacting employment agencies.
A few differences in unemployment definitions remain in the IADB data. As described in the Appendix, we have made simple adjustments to account for these differences. Table A1 reports our final version of the IADB data.
B. A New Data Set
Our study also examines a data set for 19 countries that covers far more years than the IADB data. For a number of countries we have annual data on unemployment back to the 1970s, with few missing observations. We have pieced together these data from country-specific sources -central banks, labor ministries and national statistical agencies -and international agencies such as the ILO (International Labor Organization).
It is challenging to find consistent data. There is great variation in how unemployment is measured, both across countries and over time in a given country. For example, some unemployment series cover a few cities and others cover the whole country; the series cover varying age groups (e.g. 12+ or 14+); and the definition of unemployment varies widely. Sometimes virtually everyone without a job is counted as unemployed, sometimes you must have searched for work within a certain period, and so on. Often, data sources have footnotes saying that changes in methodology occurred in certain years but not saying what the changes were.
It appears hopeless to derive long unemployment series that are comparable across countries. As we've noted, the IADB's efforts to construct comparable data were successful only for scattered years since 1990. However, we have constructed longer series that we believe are reasonably consistent within each country. We can use these data to study the evolution of unemployment over time.
To derive our data, we have gone country by country to figure out how unemployment was measured in different periods. We have made judgments about which changes in methodology are small enough to ignore, and how to adjust for larger changes. In some cases we can splice different unemployment series together using periods in which they overlap. When in doubt, we have sought advice from people at the agencies that produce unemployment data.
The Appendix describes how we constructed unemployment data for each country. To illustrate our strategy, we describe here how we dealt with breaks in the data for two countries. In one case, we adjusted the data to produce a consistent time series; in the other, we could not find an adjustment that we trusted, so we discarded data.
Mexico. Our data come from a government agency, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography. They cover three cities--Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey--and begin in 1973. For years before 1985, the National Institute reports an aggregate unemployment rate for the three cities; starting in 1985, they report separate rates for each city. For the later period, we measure unemployment with a weighted average of the three city rates, where the weights are based on population in 1990.
In 1984, the government also changed its definitions of employment and unemployment. Two groups of people were moved from the category of unemployed to employed: people waiting to start a job within 30 days, and laid-off workers who expect to return to their jobs within 30 days. Also, unpaid family workers who work less than 15 hours a week, who were previously counted as unemployed, were dropped from the labor force. These changes reduce the unemployment rate. Fortunately, unemployment for the three cities was measured with both the old and new definitions in 1984. The unemployment rate was 6.0% by the old definition and 5.7% by the new definition. Therefore, to make pre-1985 unemployment rates comparable with later data, we multiply them by the ratio 5.7/6.0. Data from other countries suggests that first-time job seekers are a large share of the unemployed-sometimes more than a third. We don't know how much the unemployment rates for Trinidad and Tobago are affected by the exclusion of first-time job seekers, so we discard the pre-1987 data.
We believe that the unemployment series we have constructed will be useful for future research. These data, reported in Table A2, 
Cross Country Differences in Unemployment
Here we examine differences in unemployment across countries, seeking to explain them with variables that capture the level of economic development and institutions in the labor market. We use the IADB data on unemployment, which are comparable across countries.
Measuring Long-Run Unemployment
We are interested in a country's long-run level of unemployment, or natural rate. One could estimate this variable by averaging unemployment rates for years in which data are available. This approach may be misleading, however, because the years in the IADB data set vary greatly from country to country.
Latin American unemployment is generally higher in some years than in others, implying that the timing of data influences a country's average unemployment.
This average is higher if the country's data happen to come from highunemployment years.
In estimating long-run unemployment, we control for the timing of data. We run an unbalanced panel regression of unemployment on dummy variables for countries and years, using all country-year pairs in our sample. Our measure of a country's long-run unemployment is the coefficient on the country's dummy plus the average of all time effects. We can interpret this variable as an estimate of average unemployment over the period spanned by the entire IADB data set (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . The data reveal great heterogeneity in Latin American unemployment rates.
Long-run unemployment ranges from 1.2% in Guatemala to 12.9% in Argentina. The mean across countries is 6.0% and the standard deviation is 3.0%. This variation presents an opportunity for us to take a fresh look at the debate about unemployment. What could explain such differences across countries?
Candidate Explanations
We examine two sets of variables that might influence unemployment: measures of economic development and measures of labor-market distortions caused by government policy. Labor market policies are a focus of research on unemployment in advanced economies (e.g. Siebert, 1997; Nickell, 1997) .
Development levels are natural to examine in our context because they vary greatly across LAC countries; in 2000, for example, real GDP per capita ranged from US$ 2126 in Nicaragua to US$ 12095 in Mexico.
Here we briefly describe the variables that we examine. The Appendix gives further details on how the variables are constructed. We also examine two variables that measure taxes paid by employers, one from each data set:
Social security contributions (HP): the cost of required employer contributions to social security programs including retirement funds, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance Labor taxes (DB): the cost of "all charges levied on labor," including social security contributions, for a mid-size firm.
Cross-Country Regressions
Here we examine the explanatory power of our candidate variables for crosscountry differences in unemployment. Overall we have ten candidate variables.
With only 19 countries in the sample, we restrict attention to specifications with a small number of variables. We start with simple regressions of long-run unemployment on a single variable, then use these results to motivate multiple regressions. We first consider development variables, then labor-market variables, then combinations of the two. Table 2 GDP per capita and rural population have a correlation of -0.80 (higher-income countries are less rural). To separate the effects of these variables, we regress unemployment on both of them, as shown in the last column of Table 2 . In this specification, only rural population remains significant, suggesting that it is the primary development variable that influences unemployment. The first panel of Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of unemployment against rural population. Table 3 presents simple regressions of long run unemployment on labor market variables. Of the six variables we consider, only one, social security contributions from the Heckman-Pagés data, is significant. Higher social security contributions (SSC) imply higher unemployment. The second panel of Figure 1 shows this relationship in a scatterplot. Table 4 presents our final specification. Motivated by the previous tables, we regress unemployment on rural population and SSC. Here, rural population is significant and the significance of SSC is borderline (p=0.09). The adjusted Rsquared is 0.60. We have checked that any third variable is insignificant when we control for rural population and SSC.
Discussion
Both the effect of rural population on unemployment and the effect of SSC have straightforward interpretations. Development economists have long recognized that unemployment is generally lower in rural areas than in urban areas (e.g. Squire, 1981) . This fact is confirmed by the IADB data, which, for 17 countries, include urban and rural unemployment rates as well as total unemployment.
When we compute long run unemployment rates for each country (again removing time effects), the averages of these rates across countries are 6.3% for urban unemployment and 3.2% for rural unemployment. Thus it is natural that total unemployment is lower in more rural countries. 1 A number of factors may contribute to the difference between urban and rural unemployment. One is the Harris-Todaro (1970) effect: workers crowd into urban areas to seek scarce but high-paying jobs. Other possible factors include greater self-employment and larger informal sectors in rural areas; less unionization and weaker enforcement of minimum wages (Rosenzweig, 1987; Bernal, 2009) ; and more efficient matching of workers and jobs in small communities.
The effects of social security contributions are stressed by some students of European unemployment (e.g. Siebert, 1997) . They argue that the costs to employers create a "tax wedge" that reduces labor demand and increases unemployment. Our regressions provide some evidence for this effect in Latin America.
There is reason, however, to question the robustness of this result. Recall that one of our labor-market variables is "labor tax" from the Doing Business data set. This variable and SSC appear to be similar measures of tax wedges, although, as described in the Appendix, there are differences in details (for example, the Doing Business variable includes only taxes with statutory incidence on employers, while SSC includes contributions by workers). One might expect the two variables to be strongly correlated, but in fact the correlation across countries is only 0.30. As shown in Table 3 , the effect of labor tax on unemployment is insignificant. Future work should further explore these results and seek to determine the best measure of tax wedges.
Comparison to Heckman and Pagés
This study builds on Heckman and Pagés (2004) , who construct some of the labor-market variables that we examine. Heckman and Pagés find that labormarket variables have significant effects on unemployment in advanced economies (mainly in Europe). However, when they restrict their sample to Latin American countries, none of the variables is significant-including social security contributions, which is significant in our regressions (see Heckman- Pagés Table 8B ).
There appears to be a simple explanation for this difference in results. Heckman and Pagés estimate the effects of labor-market variables in panel data, with country fixed effects. Thus, unlike us, they do not exploit the cross-country variation in their data; instead, their results are based on variation over time. In most countries, labor-market variables such as SSC do not change greatly over time, so it is not surprising that Heckman and Pagés's results are weak.
Time Series Evidence
We now turn from cross country comparisons to examine changes in unemployment over time. Following the strategy in Ball (2009), we first identify episodes of large rises and falls in trend unemployment. Then we examine each episode to see why unemployment changed.
Identifying Large Changes in the Natural Rate
Here we use the annual time series for unemployment that we have constructed for each country in our sample (Table A2 ). These series may not be comparable across countries, but we have sought to make them consistent over time in a given country. Therefore, we can use these data to measure changes in a country's unemployment rate.
We are interested in changes in a country's long-run or natural rate of unemployment, not in cyclical fluctuations. We estimate the natural rate by smoothing the unemployment series with the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of 100. In the analysis that follows, U is the actual unemployment rate and U* is our estimate of the natural rate. 2 Using our series for U*, we identify episodes of "large" changes in the natural rate. After some experimentation, we define such an episode as a period in which U* rises or falls monotonically and the total change from start to finish is greater than four percentage points in absolute value. An episode starts at either a local minimum of a country's U* series, a local maximum, or the first year for which we have data for the country; the episode ends at the next local minimum or maximum or the last year of data.
We believe that, by focusing on large changes in U*, we pick out episodes of true, substantial changes in long-run unemployment. Smaller changes in U* 2 Many researchers treat the natural rate of unemployment as a time-varying parameter in a Phillips curve and estimate its path using data on inflation as well as unemployment (e.g. Staiger et al., 1997; Ball and Mankiw, 2002) . This approach is not appropriate for Latin American countries, because episodes of very high inflation make the assumption of a stable Phillips curve untenable. might reflect measurement error or cyclical movements in unemployment that our simple detrending has not removed.
For the 19 countries in our sample, our four-percentage-point criterion yields a total of 11 episodes of large unemployment changes-six increases and five decreases. For each episode, Table 5 lists the country, the time period, and the levels of U* at the start and end. Figure 2 shows the series for U and U* for all countries in which an episode occurred, with episodes shaded in light gray. The
Figure also shows annual data on output growth, inflation, and the real exchange rate against the U.S. dollar (increases in the variable are appreciations of the local currency); we use these data to help interpret the episodes. 3 A number of episodes include a sub-period when U* changed rapidly, accounting for most of the total change. In the rest of the episode, U* changed in the same direction, but not by much. In seeking explanations for the change in U*, we focus on what happened around the "core" period of rapid change.
Specifically, we define the core as the period when U* changed by at least 0.5 percentage points each year. In Figure 2 , the core of each episode is shaded in dark gray.
Chile, for example, experienced an episode of rising U* that lasted 18 years, from 1965 to 1983. U* rose a total of 10.1 percentage points (from 5.7% to 15.8%).
The core of Chile's episode covers ten years, from 1971 to 1980, which account for 8.2 percentage points of the rise in U*.
Across the eleven cases in Table 5 , the length of an episode ranges from 7 to 26 years. The core period ranges from 3 to 11 years, except for 20 years in Trinidad and Tobago. Each episode has one core, except for Jamaica's, which has two.
In the rest of this section, we seek to explain the large changes in U* that we have identified. For comparison, we also examine episodes in which actual unemployment, U, fluctuated sharply but U* did not change significantly.
Explaining Increases in U*
What causes increases in long run unemployment? When we examine the six cases in Table 5 and Figure 2 , we quickly see that they have something in common: in each case, the core of the episode occurred around the time of a severe contraction in aggregate demand. The demand contraction caused a large increase in unemployment, U. The fact that U* also rose substantially suggests some hysteresis mechanism through which a demand-driven increase in unemployment affects the natural rate. This story is similar to Ball's (2009) interpretation of natural-rate increases in European countries in the 1980s and 90s.
What caused the demand contractions behind the increases in unemployment?
There are two different answers, each of which is the primary explanation for three of our six episodes. In Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, the cause was a severe tightening of monetary policy motivated by the central bank's desire to reduce inflation. In Argentina, Paraguay, and Panama, the cause was a combination of capital flight and a nonaccommodative policy response: the exchange rate was not allowed to fall, or could not fall because of dollarization.
To flesh out these stories, we briefly examine each of the six episodes, focusing on the core period of rapidly rising unemployment. Our analysis is based on the macroeconomic data in Figure 2 and on historical accounts of the episodes in sources such as the United Nation's annual Economic Survey of Latin America.
We first consider the three cases of disinflation and then the three cases of We now turn to the three episodes of large unemployment increases that were triggered by capital flight. In each case, the exchange rate was rigid. When unemployment rose, it stayed high because the economy lacked the "shock absorber" of depreciation.
Argentina (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) 
Temporary Unemployment Increases
We have examined episodes in which unemployment rose and stayed high, producing a rise in our estimated natural rate U*. To get another perspective on these experiences, we compare them to episodes in which unemployment rose but then fell quickly, so U* did not rise significantly. What accounts for this different pattern?
Specifically, we examine episodes in which unemployment rose by at least five percentage points but U* rose by less than one point. Three such episodes exist: What happened during these episodes? In all three cases, the rise in unemployment was caused by capital flight, which was triggered by the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s and by contagion from Argentina in Uruguay's second episode. Thus the temporary unemployment increases had the same basic cause as some of the U* increases discussed above. The behavior of the exchange rate, however, was very different. In contrast to exchange-rate rigidity in Argentina, Panama, and Paraguay, the real exchange rate fell sharply during the temporary unemployment increases. Over 1981-86, the real exchange rate fell by 40% in Colombia and 50% in Uruguay; over 1998-2003 in The five episodes have two features in common. First, each began with a high level of U*, ranging from 14.7% to 25.5%. These starting points were legacies of economic slumps that had previously raised U*. Evidently, it is possible for a rise in U* to be reversed eventually; on the other hand, there are no cases of large U* decreases starting from a moderate initial level.
Second, in all five cases, the fall in unemployment occurred during a period when economic growth accelerated. In this respect, these cases are similar to the experiences of some European economies. Rapid growth reduced unemployment, for example, in the U.K. in the late 1980s and Ireland in the 1990s (Ball, 1999) .
Beyond these broad features, the five episodes of U* decreases are
heterogeneous. An increase in growth was spurred by a variety of factors, including shifts in monetary policy, changes in commodity prices, and in one case a rise in productivity growth. We briefly review why output growth increased in each case. Chile (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) : Average output growth during the core of this episode was 7.6%. An unusual feature of the Chilean boom is that the primary cause appears to be an acceleration of productivity growth, perhaps due to liberalization of the economy, rather than a surge in demand. The inflation rate fell over much of the period when unemployment was falling. Ball and Moffitt (2002) argue that the productivity acceleration reduced the natural rate of unemployment because workers' wage aspirations did not rise as rapidly as productivity. Trinidad and Tobago (1988-2007) 
Conclusion
This paper constructs a new data set on unemployment rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, and then explores the determinants of unemployment.
Cross-country differences are explained partly by the size of the rural population, and there is some evidence that tax wedges also matter. Within a country, large increases in unemployment are caused by contractions in aggregate demand, resulting from either disinflationary monetary policy or a combination of capital flight and a rigid exchange rate. Decreases in unemployment occur when unemployment starts very high and economic growth accelerates.
Our results about unemployment increases echo research on other parts of the world. Ball (1999) finds that disinflations explain increases in European unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. Ball (2010) finds that capital flight and exchange rate rigidity caused severe slumps in Hong Kong and the Baltic countries as well as Latin America.
Our results conflict with conventional macroeconomics, in which shifts in aggregate demand affect unemployment only in the short run. We find that demand contractions can have long run effects: unemployment often remains high for a decade or more. These findings suggest the presence of hysteresis in unemployment.
Our understanding of hysteresis mechanisms is hazy. A common story is that unemployed workers become detached from the labor force, turning a shortrun rise in unemployment into a long-run rise. However, there is little direct evidence on the strength of this effect. Understanding hysteresis should be a priority for research.
In one way, our results do not support common stories about hysteresis. Many discussions of Europe emphasize the role of unemployment insurance: it is easier to become detached from the labor force if one can live on the dole indefinitely. Yet this paper finds strong hysteresis effects in Latin America, where unemployment insurance is much less common and generous than in Europe. Our findings suggest that unemployment insurance is not essential for hysteresis. 
Tables and Figures

Dependent Variable: Estimated Long Run Unemployment
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 10%, ** Significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 1 0%, ** Significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1 %. Our adjusted version of the IADB data are presented in Table A1 . 
B. New Data Set of Unemployment Rates
We have pieced together data from country-specific sources -central banks, labor ministries and national statistical agencies-and international agencies such as the International Labor Organization. Where a methodological change appears significant but we cannot reliably estimate its effects, we discard the shortest portion of the data that yields a consistent series
Here we report the sources of data, the definition of unemployment, and our adjustments to the series for each country. Table A2 reports the data. data is 1.14. Therefore, to correct for the break in the series in 03, for 03-07, we average outcomes for the second and fourth quarter and divide the figure by 1.14. whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government agency) to terminate 1 redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (vi) whether the law requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker before making the worker redundant; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for reemployment".
• Firing Costs (DB): This variable measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages.
• Labor Tax (DB): This variable is the sum of all labor-related taxes payable by a medium size business, including payroll taxes, mandatory social
